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Abstract: We describe an environment in which the development of the world over
time is an object of uncertainty for the individual. In this environment, a natural
representation of information is in terms of non-partitional structures. However,
not all non-partitional information can be justified in this way. We identify a set
of conditions which are necessary and jointly sufficient for such a representation
-namely, that the individual's information be such that (1) whatever is known is
true, (2) whatever is known is known to be known, and (3) that information be
nested. Moreover, these three conditions are precisely those identified in a paper
by Geanakoplos as precluding speculative trade in games with generalized
information. Thus, our discussion provides an alternative perspective on the issue
of speculation.
* I thank Ken Binmore, John Geanakoplos and Jim Mirrlees for comments and many
stimulating discussions on the issues raised here. I record my thanks to the
Economics department of the University of Michigan for their hospitality during




The standard method of representing the information of an individual in an
uncertain environment is to suppose that the individual has a partition of the states
of the world and that, given a realization of a state of the world, the individual is
informed as to which element of his partition contains the realized state. A series
of recent papers have explored the possibility of relaxing the assumption that
information is partitional (Samet (1987), Shin (1987), Brandenburger et al. (1988),
Geanakoplos (1988), Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1988)). In these papers, an individual's
information is determined by a correspondence p which associates a subset of the
state space with each state. The interpretation is that, at the state W, the
individual believes that the true state is in o(w).
However, a frequent criticism of this approach is that an individual is not making
full use of the informational content of the signals he receives. Consider the
following example. There are two states w1 and w2. When w2 is realized, the
individual is informed of this fact. However, when wi is realized, the individual is
uncertain as to which state is the true state. The problem arises when we try to
close the model by assuming that the individual "knows the model". The difficulty
is this. Given that he knows the model, the individual at w1 ought to infer that W1
is the true state since, if w2 were the true state he would be informed of this fact.
In other words, if the individual understands the model, his own ignorance is an
extra signal to be utilized in making inferences about the world. Thus, Geanakoplos
(1988) is led to concede that these models describe the information of boundedly
rational individuals who ignore the subtle informational content of signals and take
signals only at their face value.
In this paper, we describe a dynamic environment in which the possible
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development of the world over time is an object of uncertainty for the individual.
This environment has the distinctive feature that when the world reaches any state
during its process of transition from state to state, there is a chance that the
transition will halt there. In this environment, a natural representation of the
information of an individual is in terms of non-partitional structures. Here,
information is non-partitional even though the individual fully understands the
model. Thus, the individuals in our framework are not vulnerable to the charge
that they are failing to comprehend their environment.
However, not all non-partitional information can be given a representation in terms
of our dynamic framework. The main result of this paper is that the following
three conditions are each necessary and jointly sufficient for such a representation:
(1) that an individual cannot "know" falsehoods, (2) that if an individual knows
something, he knows that he knows, and (3) that information be nested.
Quite apart from any intrinsic interest in such a characterization, this result
gains added significance due to Geanakoplos's(1988) finding that the three conditions
above are each necessary and jointly sufficient to preclude speculative trade in
games where players have generalized information. Thus, there turns out to be an
intimate connection between the possibility of a dynamic representation and the
possibility of speculative trade. Indeed, by utilizing the conditions of a dynamic
representation, we are able to identify the causes of speculative trade when
information is non-partitional. Essentially, the reasons for speculative trade can be
traced to the violation of a generalized form of the dominance principle.
We order our discussion as follows. In section 2, we describe the dynamic
environment which forms the basis of our analysis. In section 3, we define the
notion of dynamic representation and present our main characterization result. The
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proof of this result is obtained as a consequence of the discussion in sections 4 and
5. In section 4, we set out a systematic procedure for constructing a dynamic
representation of any information structure satisfying the three conditions above.
This yields a constructive proof of the sufficiency half of our theorem. In section
5, we demonstrate the necessity of each of the three conditions.
Finally, in section 6, we analyse the issue of speculation. By drawing on the
results of Geanakoplos (1988) and the criteria for a dynamic representation, we
provide intuitive explanations of the causes of speculative trade.
2. The Environment
Our environment is based on the following objects. 12 is an arbitrary set of
states w, M is a finite set of messages g, and a is a signal, defined to be a
function a: -+ M. We shall assume that M is finite and has m elements. The
i th message is denoted by ,u.
Time is discrete and is indexed by the non-negative integers. At time 0, no state
is realized, and hence, no message is issued by a. At time 1, precisely one state is
realized, and a message is issued according to the signal o-. We shall assume that
the message ut is issued with probability ut. Let u =(u 1,u 2, .. ,A).
From time 1 onwards, the world is in precisely one of the states at any moment in
time, but the world makes transitions from one state to another over time. We
shall suppose that these transitions take the following simple form. When the
message as is issued at time t, the message pg is issued at time t +t1 with
probability pgg. Moreover, we assume that this probability is independent of the
history of past messages issued. We denote by P the matrix of transition
probabilities pig, where pgis the (i, j)-th element of P.
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The most distinctive feature of our environment can now be introduced. When
the world reaches a particular state, there is a probability that it will "settle" at
that state, and stay there forever. A physical analogy is with a particle moving
from one state to another with the feature that, having Leached any of the states,
there is a probability that it will be "absorbed" by that state. We assume that the
settling process takes the following simple form. When the world is at a state
which gives rise to the message ua1, the world settles at this state with probability
gi. We assume that each qi is non-zero, and each qi is independent of history.
Since the world settles on a state if and only if it does not make a transition, the
ith row of P sums to 1-qi. We denote by q the m-tuple (qi,q 2,...,qn).
We shall assume for the moment that there is a single individual. This individual
knows the signal o, and observes the messages issued by it. Moreover, the
individual knows u, P and q, and as soon as the world settles on a state, the
individual is aware of this fact. In other words, this individual knows everything
there is to know about his environment, subject to the imperfect information of his
signal cr.
We shall adopt as a paradigmatic example of our environment the case of an
individual facing the uncertainty generated by the spinning of a roulette wheel. A
full description of the "state" of the system given by the roulette wheel will be
extremely complex. However, the individual is able to observe the position of the
ball as it moves between the slots of the roulette wheel over time. The slots
correspond to the messages received by the individual. The proviso is that our
roulette wheel is the rather special one in which the likely position of the ball at
any moment in time depends only on its position in the previous period. lt also has
the feature that the probability of the ball settling on a slot is constant over time.
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The comparison with a roulette wheel is intended to emphasize the feature of our
environment that the payoffs are determined when, and only when, the world settles
on a state. For example, we can imagine a referee taking bets on a spin of the
roulette wheel and distributing rewards once the ball has come to rest. Thus, for
the individual, it is the long-run settling process which matters. The period to
period transitions are important only to the extent that they provide information
concerning the long-run settling process.
The long-run behaviour of our environment can be described more tractably by
constructing a Markov chain which mimicks the dynamics of our environment. This
Markov chain is constructed as follows. Define;
(2.1) 9 : = (oj (w) =.
of is the set of states which give rise to the i th message. We denote by 0 the
set of all such O. Clearly, 0 partitions f2. The transition matrix P can now be
seen as describing the transition between elements of 0. Thus, pig is the
probability that the true state will be in 8j next period given that the true state is
currently in Oi.
For each 9i, we introduce a copy 9i of O6. We denote by 0 the set of all such
copies. Let S be the union 0 U6, and we index the elements s of S so that 9. =s
and ei =s f. Denote by Q the diagonal matrix whose leading diagonal elements are
the m absorption probabilities , q2 , -. ,q , (in this order). We call this the
absorption matrix. Consider the square matrix T of order 2m given in partitioned




The j th row of T, when j _ m, is given by
(2.3) [pj PJ P... pjm 0 0... 0 qj 0... 0]
Each element of T is non-negative, and each row of T sums to unity since
p = 1 -q 3 . Thus T can be seen as the transition matrix associated with a
Markov chain on the set S. Moreover, this is a process which mimicks our original
model. When the world starts out at 6 , its transition to the first m elements of S
(the set 9) is governed by the matrix P. But in addition, there is probability q
that the world will pass to the copy Oj of 9j. By construction, once ei has been
reached, the world will never leave it. This mimicks the absorption process of our
original model. In particular, the long run properties of our environment will be
mimicked by the matrix Tn as n becomes large. The following result characterizes
the long run behaviour of our environment.




Let us remark on the interpretation of T*. Since the top left hand corner of T*
is occupied by the zero matrix, this means that, at whichever element of e the
world starts out, it will eventually settle at one of the copies 9 E e. The matrix
(I - P)~ FQ governs the probability of this settling process. We obtain this matrix in
a similar way to which the inverse of the Leontief activity matrix is obtained as a
power series (see, for example, Gale (1960) ch.9).
PROOF.
T ~ P [(Cf+P4-+-P"~)Q1
We show first that Pfl-40 as n-+e. Since E pe=1-q. and o>0for all j,
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each row sum of P is strictly less than 1. Thus, there exists 0 < r < 1 such that
Z pie < r < 1, for all j. Then,
(2.4) E (2 = PP ~k= zP"ek ~s r S3  r .
Ak eke i
That is, each row sum of P2 is bounded by r 2. In general, each row sum of Pn is
bounded by rn. Since r -+ 0 as n--+oo, we have Pfl -+0. Next, let Bn =
(I+P +- +P-'). Then,
(2.5) (1I - P ) Bn- I -- P A
Taking determinants, jl - P, |B =|1I- Pn|. But |I-P|-+I -I =1 as n -+ oo, so
that II - P, #0 and (I - P)~1 exists. Then, pre-multiplying (2.5) by (I -P)~1,
(2.6) Bn = (I-- P) )1 - (I -P)~' P
But B -+ (I - P)~' as n-+oo, since P -+0. Thus, B"Q-(I - P)~'Q. 0
Consider the matrix (I -P)~'Q. This matrix gives the long-run settling
probabilities over the copy set 5, and these probabilities mirror the long-run
settling process in our original model over the set e. Thus, the (i, j)-th element of
this matrix gives the probability that, when the world starts out at a state in 8i, it
will eventually settle on a state in O . For an individual whose payoffs are
determined when the world settles on a state, the matrix (I-P)~'Q provides the
appropriate characterization of uncertainty. More precisely, the ith row of
(J-P)~4 Q represents the individual's interim uncertainty when the true state of
the world is in .
In addition, there is a clear sense in which our dynamic environment has a "prior"
over e - namely, the distribution of settling probabilities viewed from time 0.
This prior, denoted by 't, is obtained as the weighted average of the rows of
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(I-P)~'Q, where the weights are given by the initial realization probabilities
(U1,...,Um).
(2.7) r =u(I-P)~'Q
We therefore have a concise characterization of the uncertainty facing the
individual at all points in time and at all states. At time 0, when no state is
realized, the appropriate characterization of uncertainty is in terms of the prior w.
At time 1, uncertainty at 8i is characterized by the i th row of (I--P)~'Q. At all
subsequent periods, when the world has not yet settled on a state, the i th row of
(I-P)~'Q remains the appropriate characterization of uncertainty at O.
Having prepared this background, we proceed to the main discussion of this paper.
We shall characterize the class of non-partitional information structures on 0
which can be given a reconstruction in terms of the dynamic scenario described in
this section.
3. Dynamic Representation
Let a non-partitional information structure (1Z, (p, i) be given, where 1 is an
arbitrary state space, p is a correspondence p:0-+212, and i is a probability
measure on c such that p(w) is measurable, for all w E 1. We shall, however,
assume that the range of 'p is finite, and denote by 01, 2, ---, On the subsets of 12
in the range of 'p.
The first step in attempting to give the triple (2,'p, i) an interpretation in terms




ei consists of those states at which the individual's information is 0i. The set of
all such 8i partitions G, and we denote this partition by 0. As the notation
suggests, the intended interpretation of a is as the partition generated by some
signal ':f2 -+pM, where M is a finite message space. O8 has the interpretation of
the set of states which gives rise to the i th message. (Compare with (2.1)).
We denote by 'i the probability 7r(6i). When no confusion is likely, we shall also
use the symbol 7 to denote the m-tuple (ir 2 , --- ,, ) The context should make
clear whether we intend ir to denote the vector or the measure. Also, for the rest
of this paper, we shall confine our attention to w such that 7r(O.) >0 for all i.
It was shown in the last section how the uncertainty facing the individual at each
state could be characterized by the appropriate row of the matrix (I--P)~'Q. There
is a matrix which plays an analogous role when we are given the non-partitional
structure (0, Sp, "). At a state W E 8i, the individual forms beliefs by conditioning on
<o(w) =0. Thus, the uncertainty at 9i is characterized by the ith row of the
following matrix.
' (81| 41) ?r(82|l 1) .-. ?( =0 1 * )
(3.2) ?x(81| 2) x( 82|(2) 7(6*102)
We denote this matrix by R. Since the i th row of R characterizes the
uncertainty of the individual at Og, the matrix R plays the same role as the matrix
(I -P)~Q of the last section. The interesting question is whether the matrix R
could have arisen from the dynamic scenario described in the previous section.
That is, whether there are appropriate matrices P, Q such that R -(I -P)~Q. Also,
we would need to interpret the vector xr = (w1~, --- ,i.) as having arisen from some
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initial probability distribution u = (u i , u2,..., urn) via the dynamic process determined
by P and Q. That is, whether w =u(!-P)~1Q. Finally, in order to complete the
scenario, we would have to capture the fact that the signal which generates the
partition e is the only signal that the individual has access to. For this, the
correspondence p: 0 -+2 must be at least as coarse as the partition e. That is,
each Sp(w) must be a union of elements of e. Drawing together these considerations,
we state the following definition.
DEFINITION. (S, So, w) has a dynamic representation if;
(D1) Each So(w) is a union of elements of 8.
(D2) There exist transition matrix P and absorption matrix Q such that;
R =U-P)~;Q.
(D3) There exists probability distribution u such that;
' =uR.
We present two examples of non-partitional information structures for which we
can construct a dynamic representation. In section 6, we shall encounter examples
where no dynamic representation exists.
EXAMPLE 3.1. S2={w1,W24, p(w1) = Z, o(w 2) = {w2}, and -r({wi}) = i({w 2 })= 2. Let
91={w1) and 82 =(w 2). Since each Gi is a singleton set, (D1) is satisfied. For (D2),
1 10 and= 0
R = 2 2 . Then for P=[ 01and Q = *0
j 0 00 j
so that R = (I - P)~LQ. Finally, U =[(1,0OJ yields 'x = u R, and so (D3) is satisfied.
Thus, (Gpx has a dynamic representation.
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EXAMPLE 3.2. 2 =={ 1,w2,..., 7 }, -({wi})= for all . p is as given in figure 3.1.
[Figure 3.1 here I
For each w, p(w) is represented as the smallest balloon containing w. Since
.p(w) = p(w') w=w', each element of 0 is a singleton, and (Dl) is satisfied. Define
; = {wj, for all i. For (D2), we note that;
7777 1 17-3 0 0-3 0 0
1 1 1 0 0 0 3-1-1 0 0 03 3 3
1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
R= 1 0 0 0 R~1 1 0 0 0
1 1 3--1-13 3 3
0 1 0 0 1 0
1 1
By setting all the absorption probabilities equal to 1, we have QR~1 = R-'. Thus,
3 3 0 0 3 0 0
7 1 1 0 0 0
9 0 0 0 0




which is a matrix of probabilities. Thus, (D2) is satisfied. Lastly, for (D3), we let
u = (1,0,...,0). Then, uR =(j,,...,j) ='r, so that (D3) is satisfied. Thus, the
above structure has a dynamic representation.
From the examples above, we can see a pattern emerging. Notice that the matrices
P, R? and R~' are all upper triangular, and that each of them is obtained by
"nesting" the matrices associated with each substructure in a recursive way. The
formal treatment which follows is a generalization of these themes.
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What properties of the correspondence '0 allow us to carry out this construction?
As we show below, this construction turns on three properties of the corres-
pondence S0. They are;
(Cl) W E p(w), VW
(C2) ' E (w) = (w') Q CP(w), V w, w'
(C3) p(w) f p(o') # 0 =[o(w) C p(w') or (w') C j(w)], V w, W'
The first two conditions have been examined in some detail by Samet (1987) and
Shin (1987). (C1) corresponds to the principle that whatever is known is true, while
(C2) corresponds to the principle that whatever is known is known to be known.
(C3) is the condition known as nestedness introduced by Geanakoplos (1988). The
correspondences '0 which satisfy these three conditions encompass the standard case
where information is partitional. In particular, Geanakoplos (1988) has shown that
these three conditions are necessary and jointly sufficient to preclude speculation
in the context of games with generalized information structures.
For our part, the main result of our paper is that the three conditions above are
necessary and jointly sufficient for the existence of a dynamic representation.
This result takes on additional significance in the light of Geanakoplos's result on
speculation, since we have the corollary that the existence of a dynamic
representation is necessary and sufficient for the absence of speculation.
THEOREM 1. (,A,7r) has a dynamic representation if and only if p/ satisfies (C1),
(C2) and (C3).
The proof of this result will be obtained as a consequence of the discussion in
the next two sections. Let us first consider necessity. The necessity of (Cl) and
(C2) are easy to show. (C1) follows from the property of our dynamic environment
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that, when the world starts out from a state, there is a non-zero probability that it
will settle there. (C2) is a consequence of the transitivity of the accessibility
relation. That is, if a transition is possible from ai to 8 aind also from 0 to 8k,
then the transition from 8i to ok is always possible.
The necessity of (C3) is harder to show. We rely on an argument which shows
that, if (C3) does not hold, then either u or P has a negative entry. Since the
entries in u and P must be probabilities, we conclude from this that no dynamic
representation exists when (C3) fails.
For the sufficiency part of the proof, we exhibit an effective procedure for
constructing u, P and Q which satisfy the appropriate properties. This boils down
to checking that u and P have entries which are probabilities. This is the subject
of the following section.
4. Sufficiency
In this section, we shall set out a systematic procedure for constructing a dynamic
representation of a structure (S2, (p, w) where p satisfies (C1), (C2) and (C3). As a
by-product of this discussion we will have proved the sufficiency half of theorem
1. Let us start with some preliminary results.
LEMMA 4.1. If p satisfies (Cl) and (C2), each o(w) is a union of elements of e.
PROOF. Suppose not. Then, there exist 91 and 0t such that f1 4#0 but
9/;Og.Take any w EO fl Oy Then, 'p(o) =0g. By (C1), %;C 4g Thus, @ 4 g.
But since w E 0,g, we have, by (C2), 'p(w) =$ C $ which is a contradiction. 0
Let us denote by 6(w) the element of 0 which contains w. When each 'p(w) is a
union of elements of 0, w' E 'p(w) 4 O(w') Q 'p(w). We shall define the binary
relation -< on 0 so that O8 5Og is taken to mean O7 G @g. Together with the
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assumption that each 98 is non-null, we have;
(4.1) 8i 8j0 8 C0 @ 7(9 |i) > 0
LEMMA 4.2.
(i) If w satisfies (Cl) and (C2), - is a partial ordering.
(ii) Suppose p satisfies (Cl) and (C2). Then p satisfies (C3) if and only if the
structure (0, :) is a union of trees.
PROOF. (i) From (Cl), 8i C 4i for all i. Thus, - is reflexive. Next, (C2) implies
that when Qj Di, we have @ 4Cy>. This implies the transitivity and anti-
symmetry of -<. For transitivity, note that when 9. C 0i and 0k C , we have
ej C * 'jC0, so that s is transitive. Also, when 9 s 9 jand 8 -98, we have
ci = j, so that 8L=9j. Thus, - is anti-symmetric.
(ii) cc satisfies (C3) whenever, for all w, w', w",
(4.2) w E p(w') f p(w") [c(&') Cp(w") or p(w") Q p(w')].
By (Cl) and (C2), woE (w') p(w) Cp(w'). Thus, (4.2) is equivalent to;
(4.3) w E 'p(w') fl((w") = [w'E P(w") or w"E (w')).
We know that w E p(w') p 9(w) 'p(w') 8 0(w') -< 8(w). Thus, (4.3) is equivalent to;
(4.4) [8(w') -c 0(w) and 8(w") -< 8(w)] [8(w') - 8(w") or 8(w") - 8(w')]
That is, for any R E 8, all its predecessors according to 5 are totally ordered by
-<. Thus, each connected component of (9, -. ) is a tree. 0
By this lemma, when po satisfies (C1), (C2) and (C3), the ordered structure (0, <) is
a collection of trees. When (0, s) consists of more than one tree, each tree can be
regarded as a separate information structure and be treated in isolation. Thus, we
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shall confine our attention to the case where (0, -) is a single tree.
0
Thus, suppose (9,1 ) is a tree with root 0. We shall associate a matrix with each
node of the tree by means of the function f defined as follows.
(i) For each terminal node 9, f(9) ={[1]. That is, we associate with each terminal
node the matrix consisting of the single entry 1.
(ii) Suppose 9 is a non-terminal node, and suppose 6_1, 12, --- , 8k are the immediate
successors of 0. Suppose also that f(91) = S1, f(92)= S2 , ... , f(0k0=Sk. Then f(e)





This is the matrix obtained from the block diagonal matrix which has
(S1, S2, ... , Sk) along the leading diagonal by adding a column of zeros on the left, and
0
- then adding a row of l's on the top. Define the matrix D to be f(O). That is, D is
the matrix associated with the root of the tree. We then index the set 0 as
follows. If the first row of f(G) appears in the i th row of D, we let 9 =09.
[Figure 4.1 here]
We shall say that a matrix X is nested inside a matrix Y if there is a
partitioning of Y such that X appears as a component in this partitioned matrix.
By construction, Og Og if and only if f(07) is nested inside f(0 g). Since the top
row of f(6g) consists of l's, O; a O; implies that d1 1 =1. Conversely, the i th row of
D consists of zeros except for those entries which form the first row of f(Oj).
Thus, di =1 implies that O; a O7. Together,
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ri if 9 -<69.
(4.6) di=
0 otherwise
We note that each matrix in the range of f is an upper triangular matrix with l's
along the leading diagonal. This ensures the non-singularity of any matrix
associated with a node of our tree. We then note the following feature of the
matrices [f(0)]-1.
LEMMA 4.3 For any 0 E , the first column of [f(0)]-' has precisely one non-zero
entry - namely, 1. For i 2, the i-th column of [f(8)]~1 has precisely two non-zero
entries - namely, 1 and -1.
PROOF. The proof is by induction. We show that the conditions of the lemma
hold for each terminal node, and then show that when the conditions of the lemma
hold for all immediate successors of a node 0, they hold for 0 also.
For a terminal node, f(0) = [f(0)]-i =[11, and so the conditions of the lemma hold
trivially. Next, let 0 be a non-terminal node. Suppose 11, !2, -..- k are the
immediate successors of 6, and that f(i) = S1, f(92)= S 2 , ... , =fk Sk. Then f(G)




This is the matrix obtained from the block diagonal matrix which has
(S-', Si, ... , Si) along the leading diagonal by first adding a column of zeros on the
left, and then adding a top row given by x =(zix2... ,xg), where x1 = 1, and for
i 2,
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-- 1 if there is precisely one non-zero element below x4
0 otherwise
By the induction hypothesis, each S' satisfies the conditions of the lemma. By
construction, xi = -1 if and only if the first column of one of the matrices Sj1
appears in the i-th column of (4.7). Thus, in each column of (4.7) except the first,
there are precisely two non-zero elements (1 and -1). Since x1i=1, the first
column of (4.7) has this element as the only non-zero element. Thus, (4.7) satisfies
the conditions of the lemma. Therefore, our proof will be complete when we have
shown that (4.7) is the inverse of (4.5).
Denote by A the matrix obtained by post-multiplying (4.5) by (4.7). We verify
that A is the identity matrix. It is clear from inspection that all rows of A from
the second row to the last coincide with the corresponding row of the identity
matrix. Thus, it remains to check that the top row of A is given by (1,0,...,0). Let
(all, a 12, ... ,ale) be the top row of A. For all i, all is the sum of the elements of
the i-th column of (4.7) since the top row of (4.5) consists of 1's. Thus, an=1 and
alt =0 for i 2. This shows that (4.7) is the inverse of (4.5) and completes the
proof of the lemma. 0
Now, since each f(O) is an upper triangular matrix with l's along the leading
diagonal, so is its inverse [f(O)]~. But the above lemma implies that each column of
[f(0)]~1 has precisely one positive element - namely, 1. Thus, the diagonal entries
are the only positive entries in [f(o)]~ 1. This gives us the following corollary.
COROLLARY. D~' has l's along the leading diagonal and has no positive entries off
the leading diagonal.
With this corollary, we can construct the matrices P, Q and vector u which give
us the dynamic representation. Consider the matrix R. From (4.1), we know that
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the (i, j)-th entry of R is positive if and only if BL % . Denote by ri 2 the (i, j)-th
entry of R. From (4.6), we can express R in terms of D as;
(4.8) r= di
Then, R~' can be expressed in terns of D~ as follows.
(4.9) r =d
To see this, we verify that i r 4,)is given by;
k_ -1) _____ (-l)1( j)fl if i =
di k -)d ckdi-dd i
(k) (t) toif i7-j
Then, by the above corollary, R' has positive leading diagonal entries and has no
positive entries off the leading diagonal. Let F >0 be a number small enough so
that £ R~1 has entries whose absolute value is strictly less than 1. Let Q be the
diagonal matrix E 1. Q then qualifies as an absorption matrix. Define P =I -QR~ 1 .
The matrix QR~' has the following features. The entries along the leading diagonal
are positive, and there are no positive entries off the leading diagonal. Moreover,
all entries have absolute value strictly less than 1. Thus, P is a matrix of
probabilities. So, there are matrix P, Q satisfying the appropriate conditions such
that R =(I - P)~'Q. This satisfies (D2).
For (D3), let u = (1,0,0,... ,0). Since the top row of D consists of 1's, the top row
of R is the vector = ( ,,..., i). Thus, uR = r, and (D3) is satisfied. Lastly,
lemma 4.1 shows that (D1) is satisfied. Thus, when <p satisfies (C1), (C2) and (C3),
the structure (l, (p, ir) has a dynamic representation.
5. Necessity
In this section, we shall show that each of the conditions (C1), (02) and (C3) is
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necessary for the existence of a dynamic representation. We proceed by
considering the necessity of (CI), (C2) and (C3) in turn.
Necessity of (C1). Suppose (2, Sp, 7) has a dynamic representation. Then
R =(I-P)'Q for some P and Q. We know that (I--P)~1Q is the limit of the
sequence of sums Q+PQ + P2Q +---+P"Q, where each term in this sum is a matrix
of non-negative entries. Since Q is a diagonal matrix of positive entries, (I-P)~'Q
has positive leading diagonal entries. That is, ic(8 |g) >0 for all i. But since
(G, ,w) has a dynamic representation, (D1) is satisfied, and each "g is a union of
elements of e. Thus, 9i C O for all i. So, for any w E ig, w E 9 C Og = p(w).
Thus, (Cl) holds.
Necessity of (C2). Suppose (c2, Sp, i) has a dynamic representation. Denote by rig
the (i,j)-th element of R. That is, r i = w(8,|"). Since R =(I-P)~1Q and Q is a
diagonal matrix of positive entries, rid has the same sign as the corresponding
element of (I-P) 1 . Thus, ri) >0 :p J >o prj>0 for some n Z0. Now,
n-o
suppose rij>0 and rj>O. rt 1 >0 p()>0 for some n 0, and r g>0 Pik>0
for some m 0. Then, p pit z ve>ptPip > 0 so that rik >0. Therefore,
when rigj>0 and rfk >0, we have rik >0. By (D1), ri 1 >0 m Oj C @. Thus,
(5.1) [6j CO i& Ok C 4j ] =>k C Oi
Take any three states w, w', w". Let W E Oi, w'E 8j and w" E . Then ho(w) =Og
and p(w') = 'g, and (4.1) implies;
(5.2) [w' E p(w) & w" E p(w')] a w" E Wo(W),
which is the statement of (C2).
Necessity of (C3). Suppose that (12, p', w) has a dynamic representation but that po
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does not satisfy (C3). From this, we derive a contradiction. By the necessity of
(Cl) and (C2) and part (ii) of lemma 4.2, (0, -_) contains at least one connected
component which is not a tree. Thus, there is an element . E E and two immediate
predecessors of 0 (denoted by 8i and 02) such that 0i and 02 are unrelated by <.
We then have the following lemma concerning the indexing of 0.
LEMMA 5.1. There is an indexing of the set a so that;
(5.3) (i) 8i e0 j= i S j, for all i, j E (1, ... , m}
(ii) 81 =0, 82 = i+1' 8 =9i+2, for some i E {1, ... ,rm}.
PROOF. Partition the set 0 into A and ®\A, where
(5.4) A ={0|#10 09or 02<0 or 8-<0}
Suppose a\A has (q-1) elements. Index this set with {1,2,...q-l) as follows. Pick
any _ -minimal element and assign it the index 1. In general, assign the smallest
available index to a state whose predecessors have all been assigned an index. This
indexing of ®\A satisfies 5.3(i) for i,j E{1,...q-1). Next, let 81= 09, A2=8q+1,
0 =0+2 so that 5.3 (ii) is satisfied. Then, index the rest of the states in A with
the set {q+3,...,m} in the same manner as for 9\A. That is, we assign the
smallest available index to a state whose predecessors have all be assigned an index.
As a result, the indexing of A satisfies 5.3(i) for t,j E {q, q +1,...m).
Now, take any 0 E 0. We show that 0 -< 4Q implies i j. There are two cases.
First, suppose 03 E 0\A. Then, all predecessors of 0; are in @\A. (Since, if 97has
a predecessor in A, then 03 must also be in A by the transitivity of -<). In this
case, O, 3 implies i j since the indexing of 0\A satisfies 5.3(i). Next, suppose
%yE A and 0; .<07. If 01 E A, then i ( j since the indexing of A satisfies 5.3(i). If
eg E \A, then i g q -1 and j >_ q so that t < j. Thus, we conclude that the indexing
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of e as a whole satisfies 5.3(i). 0
Consider the matrix R with the indexing of states 5.3 (i) and (ii). R has the
following features. Firstly, R is an upper triangular matrix. To see this, recall
that ri 3 >0 6i c 0j. Hence, by 5.3(i), ri >0 = i S j. This is the definition of
R being upper triangular. Secondly, all the elements along the leading diagonal of R
are positive as we showed in the proof of necessity of (Cl). Together with the
fact that R is upper triangular, this ensures the non-singularity of R.
Let D be the matrix whose (i, j)-th element is defined as follows.
(5.) g =1 if rij > 0(5.5) di, ={: U
0 otherwise
D inherits the following features from R. D is upper triangular. D has 1's along
the leading diagonal. Clearly, D is non-singular, and we denote by d g~" the (i, j)-th
element of D~ 1. The inverse of a triangular matrix is itself triangular, so that;
(5.6) did ~ =did
k {kligkSj}
Thus, D~1 has l's along the leading diagonal. Consider two elements of DD 1 in
particular' - the (i, i +2)-th element and the (i +1, i +2)-th element. From (5.6), we
have,
(5.7) dig di di 1 di4 0
0 di+,i1 d i 1z d i+, i+2 0
2+2 ,+2
We know that dLig = d ~ ~ 1 since D has l's along the leading diagonal. Also,
d+,+ = 1 for the same reason. Moreover, by 5.3 (ii), 01 -< 01+, O, 2; Gi+2 but
ei 6 Thus, d1 , 2 1, d ~, 1 2 =1 but d1,~ =0, and (5.7) now reads;
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(5.8) 1 0 1 d, += [
0 1 1 dt 0L +, 12 [o
1 i2
which implies that d ,1) 2 = d i 1' 42= -1.
Finally, from the supposition that -r = uR, we have u=' R-1. The j-th
component of u is given by;
(5.9) uj xr x id j- -= T(0 ) didj
i-1 " i"
Consider the (i +2)-th column of D~1. We have shown above that there are at
least two entries in this column which take the value -1. Now, either this column
has a positive entry other than dci2 i+2 or it does not. If it does, then the matrix
P has a negative entry, since P = I -QR~' and an entry of D~1 has the same sign
as the corresponding entry of Q R~'. If it does not, then the sum of entries in this
column is at most -1, so that ui+ s- it(*2) < 0 by (5.9). In either case, we have
a contradiction with our initial supposition that P is a matrix of probabilities and u
is a vector of probabilities.
Our conclusion that either P or u has a negative element is robust to the
renaming of states. Recall that when we exchange two rows of R, we exchange the
corresponding columns of R~1. Thus, when we swap the index between 9, and 9j,
we exchange the i-th and j-th rows and i-th and j-th columns of R and R~ 1. Since
our conclusion rests only on the sign of the elements in D~-1 and the column sums of
D~,we conclude that our result is robust to the renaming of states.
We started with the supposition that (2, tp, r) has a dynamic representation but
that 'p is not nested and have obtained a contradiction. We therefore conclude that
nestedness is a necessary condition for the existence of a dynamic representation.
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6. Speculation
We conclude by exploring the connection between the possibility of speculative
trade and the dynamic representation of individuals' information structures. In
order to keep the exposition simple, we shall assume in this section that 0 is finite,
and that w((w)) >0 for all states W.
We define rational choice as follows. For a given individual, his payoffs are
determined by his payoff function h: A X 1 -+ R, where A is the set of actions.
Thus, h(a,w) is the payoff to this individual at w when he takes action a. Any
function f :2 -+ A such that p(w) = p(w') = f(c) = f(w') is called a strategy. We
say that the strategy f is optimal at w given 'p if ;
7({w'})
(6.1) f(w) maximizes h(a,w')
a E A x(SpC))
w 'E4'(w)
That is, f is optimal at w given p if the action f(w) maximizes the expected payoff
conditional on the information .p(w). We say that f is optimal given Sp if it is
optimal at all states given Sp.
Geanakoplos (1988) has shown that when Sp satisfies (C1), (C2) and (C3), an optimal
strategy f given p satisfies the following important property.
(6.2) h(f(w), w) r({w)) > h(a, w) ({w}), Va E A.
W w
In other words, an optimal strategy f does at least as well as any single action a.
Alternatively, we can read (6.2) as stating that the information conveyed by p
allows the individual to improve upon the situation where he has the trivial
information 12 at all states. Geanakoplos shows that this property is instrumental in
deriving no speculation results, and he generalizes a non-speculation result to a
context in which individuals hold non-partitional information.
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Since we have demonstrated that the existence of a dynamic representation is
equivalent to (C1), (C2) and (C3), Geanakoplos's results on speculation carry over to
our dynamic framework. In particular, it is instructive to see the role played by
the dynamic representation in precluding speculation. It turns out that each of the
clauses defining a dynamic representation has an intuitive interpretation. We shall
illustrate the role of the three clauses (D1), (D2) and (D3) by showing what happens
when any one of these conditions fail. It is most natural to start with (D3).
Role of (D3). Let x be a column vector of m numbers x;, x2, ... ,Xm. Think of x as
the payoffs associated with a lottery ticket which yields the prize xi when 81
obtains. Then (D3) implies that there is a probability distribution u over G such
that;
(6.3) x = u R x.
Let us denote by x the random variable defined on $ whose value at 9i is xi.
Then, the left hand side of (6.3) is simply the expectation of z. For the right hand
side, notice that the product R x is a column vector whose i-th component is the
conditional expectation of X given the event 4i (denoted by E(z j@*i)). Thus, (6.3)
can be expressed as;
(6.4) E(z) = u2 i E( I0i).
Thus, (D3) ensures that for any random variable z, its expectation is a convex
combination of the conditional expectations. This brings to mind the rule in
probability theory that the expectation of a random variable is given by the
expectation of the conditional expectations of that random variable. (6.4) is a
generalization of this rule in which the weight ug need not correspond to the
probability of .
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An important consequence of (6.4) is that it guarantees a generalized form of the
dominance principle. This principle is defined in the obvious way - that is, for
any random variables x and b,
(6.5) E(z|ID) Z E(9|eg), Vi = E(i) Z E(Q)
That is, if x is preferred to y given any possible information, then x is preferred to
y ex ante. When (D3) fails, we can construct examples where dominance no longer
holds, and this leads to speculative trade. Consider the following example due to
Geanakoplos (1988). Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1988) has similar examples.
Let S1 = {w1,w2,w3} and ir({o,})=I, for all i. Consider two lottery tickets x, y
which yield the following prizes.
W1  W2  (A3
x 0 0 10
y 6 6 0
Suppose there are two individuals, I and 2. 1 has the trivial information pi'(w1) =fl
for all i, while 2 has the information defined by the correspondence j,2, where
2(2)= {w1, W3 ), 2(w)2) = W 21 },, 2(W3) = {W3}
[Figure 6.11
Consider the allocation where 1 has x and 2 has y. This allocation is ex ante
Pareto optimal since both individuals prefer y to z. However, the conditional
valuation of x and y by 2 is as follows.
E(x*o 2 ) 5 5 10
E(yko 2 ) 3 3 0
Thus, at the interim stage, 2 prefers x to y. This opens up the possibility of
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trade between I and 2 in which the lottery tickets are swapped. This trade can be
seen as a bet between the two individuals as to what the true state of the world is.
2 has finer information than 1 but he does worse on average by trading his y for x.
This failure on 2's part is due to the fact that dominance is violated. In turn, we
can trace this to a failure of (D3). By letting O6 ={tw.), we see that the solution to
w =u uR yields u =( 3, 3, -i). The third component is negative, violating (D3).
Role of (D2). The notion of dominance described above is a rather weak requirement
on rational choice, and there are instances of the failure of rationality similar to
the one examined above, which manage to "slip through". The role of (D2) is
complementary to that of (D3), and consists in reinforcing the notion of dominance.
It is best to illustrate this with an example. Consider the following modification of
the example above. Q = w ,( 2 ,W 3 , W4 and l({Wt}) =, for all i. Consider again two
lottery tickets x and y with the following prizes.
W1  W 2  (J3 W4
x 0 0 0 10
y 0 6 6 0
There are two individuals who share the prior r. The first individual has the
trivial information 4o1(w )= 2 for all i. The second individual's correspondence p2
is given as follows. 2 ( 1) = (, cp
2(w 2) ={.2,4 , 2
2(2 3 ) = {w3 , w 4 }, V2(W4) = {w4.
[Figure 6.2 here]
This example is a minor modification of the previous example in which we have
added the state w1 at which both lotteries pay zero. Notice that (D3) is now
satisfied for u =(1,O, ... ,0), so that dominance now holds. However, our intuition
would suggest that the same considerations which caused problems for 2 in the
previous example would also play a role here. This is indeed the case. 2's
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conditional evaluations of the lotteries x and y are as follows.
wi W2  (w3 w{
E(xIp) 2 5 5 10
E(y|op) 3 3 3 0
The allocation where 1 has x and 2 has y is ex ante Pareto optimal, since both
individuals prefer y to x ex ante. However, at the interim stage, 2 is willing to
trade y for x at W2, w3 and w4. At w,, individual 2 prefers to keep his y. Indivi-
dual 1 is always willing to trade. The payoffs associated with 2's strategy of
trading at w2, w3 and w4 and not trading at wi are (0, 0, 0, 10), so that the expected
payoff to this strategy is 2). However, this falls short of the expected payoff of
not trading at any state, which is 3.
Again, we have an example where finer information leads to a worse outcome.
Notice that (D3) has no force in this example. What has happened is that the
failure of dominance has been obscured by the introduction of the state wl. The
role of (D2) is precisely to expose this sort of masking of the failure of dominance.
To see this in the example above, note that p2 satisfies (Dl) and (D2) but is not
nested. Thus, from our theorem, we know that (D2) must be violated. Let 0i ={wi).
Then,
11 14-2-2 14 4 41 -2 2
R= 0 0 R'= 0 2 0 -1
0 0 0 0 2 -1
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
We know that P = I - QR~'. Since Q is a diagonal matrix of positive elements,
P14 < 0 since r= 1 > 0. Thus, P has a negative entry, so that (D2) fails.
When taken together, (D2) and (D3) can be seen as working in concert to ensure
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dominance within each substructure of (0, So). (D3) requires that dominance be
satisfied for the structure as a whole, while (D2) complements this by applying a
similar criterion to each connected substructure of (0, s). The combination of (D2)
and (D3) is closely related to Geanakoplos's (1988) notion of positive balancedness.
Role of (D1). Finally, we illustrate an instance of the failure of (D1). Let £2 =
(WIw 2 ,w3 and 7t(wi)= 3, for all i. Consider lotteries x, y below.
wl W2 W3
x 0 0 5
y 2 2 2
There are two individuals, 1 and 2, who share the prior -r. 1 has the trivial
information =p(wi) = for all i. 2's correspondence p2 is such that co2(w1) =
2(W3)= £ and 'p2 (w2 ) = {w2,w3}. Consider the allocation in which 1 has x and 2 has
y. This allocation is ex ante Pareto optimal since both individuals prefer y to x.
However, at the interim stage trade will take place. 2's conditional valuations of x
and y are;
E(xI co) 36 2 3
EMyIS2) 2 2 2
At w2, individual 2 is willing to trade, while at w1 and w3, he is not willing to
trade. Since individual 1 is always willing to swap his x for y, trade will take place
at the interim stage at w2 - However, the payoffs associated with 2's strategy are
(2,0,2) and this leaves 2 worse off on average than keep his y.
Let us identify the reasons behind 2's failure. 2's problem is that his information
at w2 makes trade appear attractive even though his behaviour at other states
betrays this appearance. The decision to trade at (A2 is essentially a gamble with
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individual 1 concerning the likelihood of w3 . However, this decision to trade will
only be profitable for 2 when 2 is actually in possession of x at w3. However, at
w3, 2's information is no better than 1's information there, and 1 ends up by
preferring y instead.
Thus, there is a failure of forsight on 2's part. At w,, 2 ought to anticipate what
his information would be at w,, and hence what his action would be there, but fails
to do so. This failure results in 2's wishful thinking at W2 that he can win the bet
with his opponent.
The above example is an instance of the failure of (D1). The partition 0 is given
by {w 1, w3}, {w2}}, while (p2(w2) ={w2, W3 }, so that p2(w2) cannot be expressed as a
union of elements of 0. (D1) stipulates that an individual can only rely upon
information which will actually be received (in the form of the signal a). When
(D1) fails as above, the individual. is relying on information which will not be
delivered. In short, the individual is guilty of wishful thinking. This wishful
thinking can lead to ill-advised trade, as we see above.
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